Sacrifice, Suffrage, and Sweat: An Experimental Analysis of Democratic Choice and Effort Provision in Teams

• Dr. Alric N. Vosteyn

  Department of Political Science, Central European University, Vienna, Austria

  Author

• Dr. Mirelle T. Karvin

  Behavioural Science Group, Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom

  Author

Getting people to pull together is one of the oldest challenges of teamwork. In any group, there's a temptation for individuals to slack off and free-ride on the efforts of others. While managers have tried countless ways to solve this problem, one of the most powerful tools might be one we often overlook: democracy. This study explores a simple but powerful idea: what happens when you let a team vote on its own work rules, especially a rule that involves a shared sacrifice? We designed a laboratory experiment where teams of people worked on a real task. Some teams had a costly, unproductive work requirement forced upon them. Others got to vote on whether to adopt that same rule. Our findings were clear. The act of democratically choosing to make a sacrifice dramatically increased the team's productivity—far more than when the rule was simply imposed. It seems that collective choice builds a sense of commitment and legitimacy that helps people overcome the urge to free-ride. This research shows how democratic processes can be a practical tool for aligning individual and group goals, offering fresh insights for how we think about motivation, contracts, and management.

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